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Jordan held its ﬁrst elections since the beginning of the
“Arab Spring” on January 23, 2013. Against the backdrop of
region-wide mobilization in the Middle East, which led to
the ousting of authoritarian President Mubarak in Egypt in
2011 and the civil war in Syria, the elections to the 17th
lower house of parliament in Jordan were widely consid-
ered a political litmus test for King Abdullah II. Jordan
experienced its own opposition mobilization throughout
2011 and 2012, with unprecedented criticism of the mon-
arch. At the same time, the general political mood in Jordan
has still overwhelmingly been one of gradual reform,
not revolution. Therefore, the parliamentary elections of
January 2013 must be seen in the context of an increasingly
politicized and frustrated Jordanian public on the one hand,
and a rather successful royal political survival strategy on
the other.
1. Background
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is formally a
constitutional, hereditary monarchy with a bicameral
parliament. National politics is dominated by the king,
who is granted wide-ranging de jure competencies. As the
head of the executive, he is not subject to a system of
legislative or judicial checks and balances. At the same
time, the king is authorized to dismiss the existing gov-
ernment, including the prime minister, and to dissolve
parliament. In the latter case, the king can govern with the
help of decrees, which was common practice under King
Hussein’s reign from 1953 to 1999. This system has
continued during the reign of his son and successor, King
Abdullah II, who acceded to the throne in February 1999.
While these formal competencies of the king in Jordan
are already substantial, his de facto political in ﬂuence
goes even beyond this. He controls a wide network of
patronage relations, which include core social groups such
as Transjordanian notables (i.e. tribal leaders hailing
from the rural areas east of the River Jordan) as well
as Palestinian-Jordanian crony capitalists ( Bank and
Schlumberger, 2004 ).
Given this concentration of political power in the hands
of the king, the Jordanian parliament is not capable of
exerting substantial control and legislative functions vis-à-
vis the executive. Rather than initiating laws themselves,
parliamentarians in Jordan usually rubberstamp, some-
times add and only in exceptional cases reject the
government ’s proposals. Despite these clearly limited ca-
pacities for democratic control, there is a high degree of
competition for accession to parliament. Parliamentary
elections in Jordan are more than pseudo-democratic re-
form theater for the Jordanian population and, in particular,
Jordan’s Western donors – on whom the country is ﬁnan-
cially dependent. In line with what Ellen Lust (2009) un-
derstands as “competitive clientelism, ” election campaigns
in countries like Jordan are usually less about program-
matic and ideological differences and more about the
patronage opportunities and spoils related to parliamen-
tary seats – especially for the broader family and tribal
support base. Seen in this light, the Jordanian parliament
has therefore been termed a “service parliament ” (Clark,
2010, p. 126).
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2. Electoral system
Since the Constitution of 1952, Jordan has had a
bicameral parliament. The lower house, the House of Rep-
resentatives (Majlis an-Nuwwab), is one of the few bodies
in the Jordanian polit ical system which is elected directly.
The upper house, the Senate (Majlis al-A’yan), is appointed
by the king. Parliamentary process, however, was sus-
pended during the period of martial law from 1967 to 1989.
During that t ime, there were no general elections, and
polit ical part ies were banned until 1992. Consequently, the
ﬁrst mult i-party elections since 1956 took place in 1993.
The 1989 elections, which were considered free and fair,
resulted in a surprise landslide victory for the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) – by far the largest and most important
social movement in Jordan. To prevent this result from
repeating itself, the king introduced a new electoral system
which favored the tradit ional backbone of the Hashemite
kingdom – conservative tribes from rural Transjordanian
areas – to the detriment of the urban population and the
Palestinians who constitute a majority in Jordan.2 Since
1993, the Jordanian electoral system has been based on the
“one man, one vote” (sawt wahid) principle – a single non-
transferable vote, where candidates compete for a direct
vote on the district level w ith only the majority candidate
w inning a parliamentary seat. This system, combined w ith
extensive gerrymandering – which favors rural and tribal
areasover urban and Palestinian ones, namely the northern
cit ies of Amman and Zarqa – contributed to a heavy tilt
towards regime loyalists, w ith large parts of the opposit ion
as well as the Palestinian Jordanians w idely excluded from
the electoral process. There have been numerous amend-
ments to and reforms of this very controversial law, the
most recent in June 2012 (Kao, 2012). This last change
included enlarging the lower house from 120 to 150 seats,
adjusting the women’s quota accordingly from 12 to 15
seats, creating an independent election committee (IEC)
and providing an addit ional ballot for the national level.
Currently, 27 of the 150 seats are reserved for “national
lists” (i.e. part ies and party-like blocks). The latter change
addsa proportional element resulting in amixed or parallel
voting system in which the party list component is not
compensatory to the plurality component.3 Furthermore,
as parties were only re-included into formal polit ical
contestation in 1992 and tradit ional personal and tribal t ies
are still strong, the Jordanian party system is underdevel-
oped. Apart from the Islamic Action Front (IAF) – the po-
lit ical w ing of theMB– the registered parties have no roots
in society and do not enjoy w idespread support.4 Although
the demonstrations that began in early 2011 did generate
some new polit ical blocs and movements, these have not
yet been consolidated into polit ical part ies. Moreover,
while the king and government described the reformed
electoral law as an attempt to strengthen the party system,
the opposit ion asserted that it would have the opposite
effect, by reinforcing tribal loyalt ies and doing nothing to
weaken the loyalist bias in the plurality component. Due to
what they saw as the deﬁcient nature of the reform and its
failure to ensure more adequate representation, the IAF
along w ith some new ly formed opposit ion groups
announced their boycott of the elections early on.
King Abdullah also announced that the prime minister
would henceforth be chosen in consultation w ith parlia-
ment – a novelty considering that he had always been
appointed by the king. However, given the secured loyalist
majority in parliament due to thebiased electoral law, it was
highly unlikely that a candidate not approved by the king
and the security services would be elected prime minister.
3. Campaign, contenders and issues
Sincemost candidateswere independentsand even most
of the party-like listswere ad hoc coalitions led primarily by
charismaticor inﬂuential Transjordanian leaders,differences
in party programs were hard to discern. While some more
conventional polit ical parties, ranging from socialists to Arab
nationalists, also took part, they did not gain any signiﬁcant
share of parliamentary seats. Since the wave of protest in
early 2011, new opposit ion groupshave emerged such as the
umbrella organization of youth movements, Jayeen (We are
Coming), and the National Front for Reform – led by former
primeminister, Ahmad Obeidat – which encompassesmany
nationalist and left ist parties; however,most of thosegroups
boycotted the elections along w ith the IAF.
Election slogans revolved mainly around corruption –
seen by the population as one of the most severe problems
facing the country (IRI, 2012) – along w ith the dire state of
the economy and institut ional reform. Even more impor-
tant, however, were the procedural issues – outside of the
actual campaigning – such as the boycott by the primary
opposit ion, the IAF, and the w ider opposit ion’s crit icism of
the pace and nature of the reforms process, especially
concerning the electoral law.
The Jordanian elections serve as more than simply the
selection of state ofﬁcials; they also reinforce the legit imacy
of King Abdullah’sgradualist approach.Successful elections
would legit imize the king’s approach abroad as well as at
home.To besuccessful, theelectionsneeded to beperceived
as freeof major electoral fraud, to attract ahigh turnout,and
to ensuremoreadequate representation – not just of loyalist
Transjordanians but of all major polit ical and social groups,
especially women, Palestinians, minorit ies and parts of the
opposit ion. Although attempts at vote-buying were re-
ported, as were some other minor violations, the January
2013 elections – in contrast to most previous contests –
wereconsidered by domestic and international observers to
be relatively free of fraud, at least on election day itself.
However, the deﬁcient electoral framework was deplored
(Carter Center, 2013). To ensure a higher turnout, the
registration date was delayed mult iple times and voter
2 The exact numbers of Palestinian Jordanians and Transjordanians in
the country are not known. Estimations range from 40 percent to 70
percent.
3 Scholars use different terms for such a system, one of the most
commonly used being “mixed-member majoritarian“ or “MMM“ (Shugart
and Wattenberg, 2003, p. 13). This term, however, is problematic in the
case of Jordan, where no real party system exists and hence no partisan
majority can emerge in the overall results.
4 This is also why Table 1 below does not show party shares and votes
but rather representation, as this gives a better understanding of the
election results.
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participation waspushed asbeing vital for the country (EIU,
2012). In contrast to the reactions to previous IAF boycotts
(1997 and 2010), the kingmademore effort to persuade the
party to take part in the elections by promising polit ical
posts and selective reforms. To further appease the Islamist
opposit ion, the king renewed his ties w ith the Palestinian
Hamas in January 2012 by receiving its leader, Khaled
Mash’al, for the ﬁrst t ime since the closing of the party’s
ofﬁce in Amman in August 1999. Ult imately, however, all
attempts to include the IAF in the elections were unsuc-
cessful. To thew ider public, the king lobbied – via speeches
and, later, the publication of “discussion papers” – for the
electoral part icipation of as many Jordanians as possible.
4. Resul ts
A total of 1425 candidates(606 individual candidatesand
819 competing on the national lists), almost tw ice as many
as in 2010, contested the 150 seats in parliament’s lower
house. Of these, around 140 were former members of
parliament (MPs) and 191 were women. Voter turnout was
56.6 percent, slightly more than in previous years (it was54
and 53 percent in the last two elections, 2010 and 2007,
respectively) and thusasuccessfor theregime.However, the
turnout percentage is calculated on the basis of registered
voters, not the eligible electorate. If the latter and larger
ﬁgure isused as thedenominator, the participation ratesare
considerably less impressive (Table 1). Turnout was sub-
stantially higher in the rural districts than in the cities of
Amman, Zarqa and Irbid. It is in the rural districts that the
competit ion for posts and vote-buying actually takes place.
Asmost of the candidates ran as independents, it is hard
to tell exactly which blocks have gained how many seats.
However, according to estimations, about 75 percent of the
new parliament are loyalists, the rest more independent and
crit ical parliamentarians (Halaby and Gavlak, 2013). Of 61
national lists, 23 made it to parliament. Only the Islamic
Centrist Party claimed asmany asthreeseats; Homeland and
Stronger Jordan each claimed two seats; and the rest of the
successful lists claimed only one seat each – meaning that
oneseat could bewon by asfew as14,000 votes(Cit izenship)
or asmany as 49,000 votes (National Current Party).
In addit ion to the 15 women elected via the quota, two
won single-member districts and a further two were elec-
ted via the national list; thus parliament now includes the
unprecedented number of 19 female MPs. The share of
Palestinian MPswent up by 25 percent, making parliament
slightly more representative than in previous elections.
Saad Hayel Srour, a veteran Transjordanian polit ician from
the Northern Badia, was elected as speaker of parliament.
5. Out look : after the elect ions, before the protests?
Immediately after the elections, King Abdullah II
appointed former prime minister Fayez Tarawneh as chief
of the Royal Court, thereby signaling the continuity of his
conservative, step-by-step approach. As the king’s envoy,
Tarawneh held talks during February 2013 w ith the
different parliamentary blocs about the future prime min-
ister and the composit ion of the government. While some
parliamentary blocs declared their support for incumbent
prime minister Abdullah Ensour (appointed in October
2012) to remain in place, others did not make clear their
preferred candidate. Similarly, parliamentarians differed as
to the kind and degree of inclusion of elected parliamen-
tarians in the next government. Overall, the process of
government formation was much slower than after previ-
ous elections, when the decision was single-handedly
taken by the king. Nevertheless, the latter’s inﬂuence still
remains decisive. After a prolonged struggle for a majority,
Ensour was ﬁnally appointed Prime Minister on March 9,
2013 and began consultationsw ith parliamentary blocks to
form his new cabinet which was sworn in on March 30.
In the short term, King Abdullah II appears to be the real
w inner of the Jordanian parliamentary elections.5 The
largely loyalist parliament, the surprisingly high turnout in
spite of all restrict ions, the largely posit ive reports by in-
ternational election observation missions, as well as the
failure of the kingdom’s key external ﬁnanciers – the Gulf
monarchies, the USA and the EU – to exert any pressure for
reform have given the monarch some polit ical breathing
room. However, even a loyalist majority is not a guarantee
of absolute acquiescence anymore, as shown by the narrow
result of a conﬁdence vote on April 23 in which only 55%
supported the government of Ensour showed (Ensour’s
government w ins vote of conﬁdence, n.d.). And as long as
discontent continues to seethe in broad sections of Jorda-
nian society, part icularly amongst the younger Trans-
jordanians, new protestscan beexpected in the near future.
In the medium term, the people of Jordan may very well
vent their grow ing frustration if the new government fails
to master the country’s central challenges: polit ical reform,
ﬁghting corruption and creating jobs.
6. Elect ion note
Not applicable for election notes.
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